Please Click on this to Sign Family Court Reform Petition

SRS POLICY ON "CINC" INVESTIGATIONS ARE THEY DOING THEIR JOB ? Click here for the entire Manual

Sample of what you'll find:

Sec. 2474 While the ultimate decision to remove a child in SRS custody rests with SRS (subject to court review), the contract agency responsible for placement and services to the child shall have the lead responsibility in the removal decision (with consultation from SRS). Removal of a child is to be based on the best interests of the child.

Remember: It is not an emergency when a long standing circumstance becomes known to the agency or contractor. For example, the contract agency learns a foster parent is consuming alcohol on a regular basis and has been for several months. If there is no report of harm to the child in placement, this information would not warrant emergency removal of the child.

MY CHILD WAS REMOVED FOR ALLEGED "TRUANCY" YET FOSTER PARENTS CAN GET AWAY WITH THAT ??

State Approved Ashton's Nine (9) Year old cousin as her Foster Parent

CLICK ON DOCUMENT TO ENLARGE !!!
Ashton's 9 year old cousin was Approved by the State of Kansas as a Her FOSTER PARENT WOW Kansas is really on a roll!!! I dont think this even deserves my time as to stating State laws, and Federal Laws as this is beyond explanation and reason and they want me to play by their rules, and they think that they know whats in the "Interest" of my child. Talk about a "Broken System" Where's the Accountability on this one ? How are they going to try and cover this up ?

PART 4: PROOF OF PERJURY BY SRS/CPS IN THEIR OWN WORDS

Part 4 : Proof of perjury by SRS/CPS in the District Attorney's/ States own petition.

Remember you may click on the document to make it larger to read it better.

Paragraph T: 2nd paragraph " Aug. 26th 2008 "Mother Contacted SRS "

Why is that important ?

Paragraph V: "An order of custody for a child in need of care was filed on Aug. 27th, 2008, The Order States that reasonable efforts have been made to facilitate the case plan: " Srs made numerous ATTEMPTS to locate the parent Bambi Hazen in order to OFFER services to the family. " MOTHER DID NOT RETURN PHONE CALLS OR RESPOND TO HOME VISITS"


K.S.A 21-3805: Perjury. (a) Perjury is intentionally, knowingly and falsely:

(1) Swearing, testifying, affirming, declaring or subscribing to any material fact upon any oath or affirmation legally administered in any cause, matter or proceeding before any court, tribunal, public body, notary public or other officer authorized to administer oaths;

(2) subscribing as true and correct under penalty of perjury any material matter in any declaration, verification, certificate or statement as permitted by K.S.A. 53-601 and amendments thereto; or

(3) subscribing as true and correct under penalty of perjury any statement as required by K.S.A. 75-5743, and amendments thereto.

(b) (1) Perjury is a severity level 7, nonperson felony if the false statement is made upon the trial of a felony charge.

(2) Perjury is a severity level 9, nonperson felony if the false statement is made in a cause, matter or proceeding other than the trial of a felony charge or is made under penalty of perjury in any declaration, verification, certificate or statement as permitted by K.S.A. 53-601 and amendments thereto.

I did contact SRS, the state was clearly aware of that yet the next day SRS told Judge Henderson I did not. THAT IS PERJURY !!!!


Due Process VIOLATION AGAIN.
There was also no notice of this hearing as required by law:

Statute 38-2243: Orders of temporary custody; notice; hearing; procedure; findings; placement; orders for removal of child from custody of parent, limitations. (a) Upon notice and hearing, the court may issue an order directing who shall have temporary custody and may modify the order during the pendency of the proceedings as will best serve the child's welfare.

(c) Whenever it is determined that a temporary custody hearing is required, the court shall immediately set the time and place for the hearing. Notice of a temporary custody hearing shall be given to all parties and interested parties.

WHAT IS THIS A LAWLESS STATE ? NO RULES APPLY ? ANYONE ELSE WONDER WHY THIS IS ALLOWED ?


Maybe this has something to do with it :

This is the prosecuting Attorney in my case Nola's Foulston Sedgwick County District Attorney's office is as corrupt as it gets. As exposed here the sad thing is my family is not the only family affected by the injustices of Sedgwick County, Kansas look it up on you tube you will be astonished with the numbers.

October 31, 2007

District Attorney Nola Foulston is pleased to announce Deputy District Attorney Ron Paschal has been recognized as Kansas Prosecutor of the Year for 2007 by the Kansas County and District Attorneys Association. Mr. Paschal was given the award on October 21^st for his dedication to prosecution and the children in Kansas. Mr. Paschal has been consistent in his continual efforts to improve the juvenile justice system within our state. He is currently chairman of the Child Advocacy Center Task Force, serves on the Kansas Supreme Court Task Force on Permanency Planning and heads up the Juvenile Division of the Office of the District Attorney.

Mr. Paschal is a long standing member of the Prosecutor Grievance and Ethics Committee for the Kansas Disciplinary Administrators Office, serves as part of the Wichita Bar Association Ethics Committee and is the Ethics Coordinator for the Office of the District Attorney for the Eighteenth Judicial District of Kansas.

Part 3

Part 3 Aug. 26th 2008 this is how the The State of Kansas Officer Nagy Wichita Police Dept. Exploited and missing children's unit kidnapped my child from our home.

In part 2 The State Of Kansas through the Dept. of SRS case worker Linda Kenney directed Law enforcement to not cancel the runaway report falsely made by Ashton's non-custodial father after I Bambi L .Hazen LAWFUL custodial parent called to cancel this "report"

Officer Nagy unlawfully:
without a warrant
without a court order
without probable cause
Entered
Searched
Seized A 13 Year old child
Arrested my 13 y/o Ashton AT HOME as a "Runaway"

KANSAS LAW REGARDING THE DEFINITION OF A RUNAWAY
Statute 38-2202: Definitions. As used in the revised Kansas code for care of children, unless the context otherwise indicates:
(d) "Child in need of care" means a person less than 18 years of age who:
(9) is willfully and voluntarily absent from the child's home without the consent of the child's parent or other custodian.

Okay Facts K.S.A 38-2202 says absent from the child's home ASHTON WAS AT HOME WITH ME HER LAWFUL CUSTODIAL PARENT !

Officer Nagy handcuffed Ashton 13 y/o and told her she was being detained for questioning in regards to a seperate incident that he was investigating.

Officer Nagy never informed Ashton that she was under Arrest.
Officer Nagy never read her her Miranda Rights.

HERE IS THE ACTUAL ARREST REPORT

Page one of this arrest report (click on the document to make it bigger) has Ashtons home address 1526 s Greenwood:

A few lines later it has arrest location 1526 S Greenwood

SHE WAS UNLAWFULLY ARRESTED AT HOME !
SHE WAS NEVER A RUNAWAY !!!
OFFICER NAGY KNEW THIS I HAVE A RECORDED AUDIO CONVERSATION BETWEEN MYSELF AND OFFICER NAGY HERE IS PAERT OF THAT RECORDED CONVERSATION
:
Me (Bambi) : You said you were detaining her for questioning
Nagy: "uh huh, and for being a runaway"
Me: "No you did not"
NAGY: Bambi I'm not going to argue bout that, that's in the past, that's done and over with"
ME: No because you illegally seized my child

Later on in the same conversation

ME:"Your supposed to be there to protect my child and you took her out of my home in hand cuff's"
NAGY: "Yes she was under arrest"
ME: "For what? You didn't tell her she was under arrest did you ?"
NAGY: "For being a runaway."
ME: "Did you tell her that when you put her in handcuffs's in my home ?
Nagy: "It seems to me being put in hand cuff's pretty much insinuates that your under arrest !"



Page two of this Arrest report Ashton was arrested under K.S.A 38-1502 (a) (9)
Well K.S.A 38-1502 was repealed in 2007. So Ashton was not even arrested on a valid state law.

Now read where it asks for Parents name and address top line of that says Mother Bambi L. Hazen address: 1526 S Greenwood Wichita Kansas.

Below that the form says

State of Kansas: Sedgwick County, ss:

I, S.W. Creighton # 2211, of lawful age, after first being duly sworn on oath, on information and belief state:

On 8-26-08 @ 12:35 hrs. I located Ashton Baker 13, wt, 12-7-94 @ 1526 S Greenwood.

ANYONE ELSE REALIZE THAT ASHTON WAS AT HOME ??

THEREFORE NOT A RUNAWAY ?

Part Two this is the way the State of Kansas removes children !

THIS IS ALL ONE DAY'S EVENTS HOW MANY LAWS CAN THE STATE VIOLATE ?
This is how Clear The State of Kansas corruption really is. Judge Henderson, Nola Foulston, Ron Pascal, Lynnette Herrmann, the Wichita Police Dept. Department of SRS/CPS.

I will include State Statutes, Federal Laws that apply.

THIS ALL HAPPENED IN ONE DAY
AUGUST 26TH 2008,

Paul L. Baker is Ashton's biological NON-CUSTODIAL father. Who is currently owes over $10,000.00 in Back Child support.

Paul and Ashton got into a disagreement and Ashton came home.
Paul thinking he would be relieved of his financial support obligation if Ashton was in states custody made a false "Runaway report"

Lawful Custodial Parent ME Bambi Hazen called ALL the proper entities including Wichita Police Dept., Exploited and Missing Children's unit , SRS to cancel the runaway report.



PARAGRAPH T: "Mother contacted SRS to inform the Agency that she was home, the child was NOT on the run and that she wanted to cancel the runaway report. Mother insisted the child was not on the run"

State Law required Officer Virgil Pinager with the Wichita Police Dept. to cancel the runaway report.

K.S.A 75-712c: Same; reports of missing persons; duties of law enforcement agencies. (b) The reporting party shall be advised to immediately notify the law enforcement agency in the event the missing person returns or is located. Upon location of or contact by the missing person, the law enforcement agency shall clear the case in the national crime information center and Kansas bureau of investigation databases.

PARAGRAPH T: "Ms. Kenney (SRS Case worker) contacted Patrol East and requested that the runaway report NOT BE CANCELLED"

Ms. Kenney from SRS/CPS and the Wichita Police Department CLEARLY conspired against my rights and my childs rights in their official capacity and as individuals.

FEDERAL LAW SAYS
Title 18, U.S.C., Section 241
Conspiracy Against Rights

This statute makes it unlawful for two or more persons to conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person of any state, territory or district in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him/her by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, (or because of his/her having exercised the same).

Punishment varies from a fine or imprisonment of up to ten years, or both; and if death results, or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of years, or for life, or may be sentenced to death.

PARAGRAPH T: "Ms Kenney made the recommendation that when the child is found that she be placed at the Wichita Childrens Home until the court hearing on Sept. 2nd 2008."

State law says:
K.S.A 38-2232: Child under 18 taken into custody; duties of officers; placed in shelter facility or with other person; application of law enforcement officer; release of child. If, after delivery of the child to a shelter facility, the person in charge of the shelter facility at that time and the law enforcement officer determine that the child will not remain in the shelter facility and if the child is presently alleged, but not yet adjudicated, to be a child in need of care solely pursuant to subsection (d)(9) or (d)(10) of K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 38-2202, and amendments thereto, the law enforcement officer shall deliver the child to a juvenile detention facility or other secure facility, designated by the court, where the child shall be detained for not more than 24 hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays.

LETS CALCULATE THE STATES VERSION OF 24 HOURS AS ALLOWED PER KANSAS LAW
Tuesday Aug 26th 08
1. Wed. Aug.27th, 08 (24 HOURS) TIMES UP PER LAW AT THIS POINT
2. Thurs. Aug. 28th, 08 (48 HOURS)
3. Fri. Aug. 29th 08 (72 HOURS)
4. Sat. Aug. 30th, 08 (DOESNT APPLY WEEKEND)
5. Sun. Aug. 31th,08 (DOESNT APPLY WEEKEND)
6. Mon. Sept. 1st, 08 (holiday DOESNT APPLY)
7. Tues. Sept. 2nd, 08 COURT DATE

FEDERAL LAW SAY'S
Title 18, U.S.C., Section 242
Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law

This statute makes it a crime for any person acting under color of law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to willfully deprive or cause to be deprived from any person those rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution and laws of the U.S.

Acts under "color of any law" include acts not only done by federal, state, or local officials within the bounds or limits of their lawful authority, but also acts done without and beyond the bounds of their lawful authority; provided that, in order for unlawful acts of any official to be done under "color of any law," the unlawful acts must be done while such official is purporting or pretending to act in the performance of his/her official duties. This definition includes, in addition to law enforcement officials, individuals such as Mayors, Council persons, Judges, Nursing Home Proprietors, Security Guards, etc., persons who are bound by laws, statutes ordinances, or customs.

Punishment varies from a fine or imprisonment of up to one year, or both, and if bodily injury results or if such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire shall be fined or imprisoned up to ten years or both, and if death results, or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death.


The Dept Of SRS through Ms. Kenney and her personal ,recommendation is contrary to State law, So in her official capacity under the color of law Social Workers are appearantly allowed to make their own laws and the other entities followed. That unlawful recommendation has resulted in and needlessly traumatized ALL 4 of my children, and in fact my WHOLE ENTIRE FAMILY.

SAME DAY AUGUST 26TH 2008 AFTER I CANCELLED THE FALSE RUNAWAY REPORT AND AFTER THE STATES RECOMMENDATION TO THE WICHITA POLICE DEPARTMENT

3 Uniformed Wichita Police Officers 1 in Plain clothes Officer Nagy with Exploited and Missing Children's unit arrive at my residence.

No Warrant, No Court order, No Probable cause.
Unlawfully enter and Search my home

Kansas State Statute
K.S.A 77-702: Public policy; purpose of act. On and after January 1, 1996, it is the public policy of the state of Kansas that state agencies, in planning and carrying out governmental actions, anticipate, be sensitive to and account for the obligations imposed by the fifth and the 14th amendments of the constitution of the United States and section 18 of the bill of rights of the constitution of the state of Kansas. It is the express purpose of this act to reduce the risk of undue or inadvertent burdens on private property rights resulting from certain lawful governmental actions.

KANSAS CONSTITUTION

Bill of Rights

§ 15. Search and seizure. The right of the people to be secure in their persons and property against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inviolate; and no warrant shall issue but on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or property to be seized.

U.S. Constitution: Fourth Amendment

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

What makes these official's acting under the "Color of Law" to perceive the laws of the land do not apply to them ? Can anyone answer me that ?

WAIT TIL YOU SEE PART 3 YOU THOUGHT THIS WAS BAD SOOO MUCH MORE.

THE SAD PART ABOUT IT IS THIS DAY AUG. 26TH 2008 IS NOT OVER SEE PART 3.

This is where it all started PART ONE !!

This is the State of Kansas's actual SECOND amended petition you dont have to be a lawyer to figure out a Court hearing requires "NOTICE" its called Due Process.

Any Attorney interested in a contingency basis feel free to email me.

LINE G : "NO SERVICE VACANT HOUSE "

LINE I: "The court Adjudicated the child as a child in need of care as to father and continued Adjudication as to Mother TO OBTAIN PROPER NOTICE !!

The court/Judge Henderson/ The District Attorney's office knew proper notice/Due process had not been obtained. Lack of service/notice/due process makes any court orders null/void, invalid, unenforceable.



LINE I: "THE CHILD WAS PLACED IN TEMPORARY CUSTODY OF SRS"

The court, Judge Henderson knowingly, and without proper authority over the said child, without proper authority over the Lawful custodial mother, without procedural, substantive due process placed MY CHILD IN TEMPORARY CUSTODY OF THE STATE.

HERE ARE A JUST A FEW AUTHORITIES ON DUE PROCESS/ VOID ORDERS

Kansas ex rel. Koontz v. Clubb

However, when a judgment is attacked under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(4) as being void, there is no question of discretion on the part of the trial court.

Medina v. American Family Mutual - A judgment against an alleged tortfeasor that is void due to lack of personal service cannot be successfully used to collect under the injured party's underinsured motorist coverage when the insurance company has not otherwise submitted to jurisdiction in the case.

"a void act cannot be ratified." In re Garcia, 105 B.R. 335 (N.D.Ill. 1989).

A party may attack a void judgment at any time in a motion separate and apart from a section 2-1401 petition. R.W. Sawant, 111 Ill. 2d at 310; City of Chicago v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 65 Ill. 2d 108, 112 (1976); Barnard v. Michael, 392 Ill. 130, 135 (1945); see State Bank v. Thill, 113 Ill. 2d 294, 308-09 (1986); Cavanaugh v. Lansing Municipal Airport, 288 Ill. App. 3d 239, 246 (1997); In re Marriage of Parks, 122 Ill. App. 3d 905, 909 (1984); First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Brown, 74 Ill. App. 3d 901, 905 (1979).

A court may not render a judgment which transcends the limits of its authority, and a judgment is void if it is beyond the powers granted to the court by the law of its organization, even where the court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter. Thus, if a court is authorized by statute to entertain jurisdiction in a particular case only, and undertakes to exercise the jurisdiction conferred in a case to which the statute has no application, the judgment rendered is void. The lack of statutory authority to make particular order or a judgment is akin to lack of subject matter jurisdiction and is subject to collateral attack. 46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgments § 25, pp. 388-89.

A void judgment is to be distinguished from an erroneous one, in that the latter is subject only to direct attack. A void judgment is one which, from its inception, was a complete nullity and without legal effect. Lubben v. Selective Service System, 453 F.2d 645, 649 (1st Cir. 1972)

A judgment rendered by a court without personal jurisdiction over the defendant is void. It is a nullity. [A judgment shown to be void for lack of personal service on the defendant is a nullity.] Sramek v. Sramek, 17 Kan. App. 2d 573, 576-77, 840 P.2d 553 (1992), rev. denied 252 Kan. 1093 (1993).

"Where there are no depositions, admissions, or affidavits the court has no facts to rely on for a summary determination." Trinsey v. Pagliaro, D.C. Pa. 1964, 229 F. Supp. 647.

"A court cannot confer jurisdiction where none existed and cannot make a void proceeding valid. It is clear and well established law that a void order can be challenged in any court", Old Wayne Mut. L. Assoc. v. Mcdonough, 204 U. S. 8, 27 S. Ct. 236 (1907).

"The law is well-settled that a void order or judgment is void even before reversal", Valley v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 41 S. Ct. 116 ( 1920 )

"Courts are constituted by authority and they cannot go beyond that power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities ; they are not voidable, but simply void, and this even prior to reversal." Williamson v. Berry, 8 How. 945, 540 12 L. Ed. 1170, 1189 ( 1850 ).

"Once jurisdiction is challenged, the court cannot proceed when it clearly appears that the court lacks jurisdiction, the court has no authority to reach merits, but rather should dismiss the action." Melo v. U.S. 505 F 2d 1026

"There is no discretion to ignore lack of jurisdiction." Joyce v. U.S. 474 2D 215.

"The burden shifts to the court to prove jurisdiction." Rosemond v. Lambert, 469 F 2d 416

"Court must prove on the record, all jurisdiction facts related to the jurisdiction asserted." Latana v. Hopper, 102 F. 2d 188; Chicago v. New York 37 F Supp. 150

"Jurisdiction, once challenged, cannot be assumed and must be decided." Also: "The law provides that once State and Federal Jurisdiction has been challenged, it must be proven." Main v. Thiboutot 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980)

"Jurisdiction can be challenged at any time." Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co. 495 F 2d 906, 910.

"Defense of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any time, even on appeal." Hill Top Developers v. Holiday Pines Service Corp. 478 So. 2d. 368 (Fla 2nd DCA 1985)

"Court must prove on the record, all jurisdiction facts related to the jurisdiction asserted." Lantana v. Hopper, 102 F. 2d 188; Chicago v. New York, 37 F. Supp. 150.

"Once challenged, jurisdiction cannot be assumed, it must be proved to exist." Stuck v. Medical Examiners 94 Ca 2d 751. 211 P2d 389.

"The law requires proof of jurisdiction to appear on the record of the administrative agency and all administrative proceedings." Hagans v Lavine 415 U. S. 533.

Though not specifically alleged, defendant's challenge to subject matter jurisdiction implicitly raised claim that default judgment against him was void and relief should be granted under Rule 60(b)(4).Honneus v. Donovan, 93 F.R.D. 433, 436-37 (1982), aff'd, 691 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982).

Kocher v. Dow Chem. Co., 132 F.3d 1225, 1230-31 (8th Cir. 1997) (as long as there is an "arguable basis" for subject matter jurisdiction, a judgment is not void).

Lubben v. Selective Service System, 453 F.2d 645, 649 (1st Cir. 1972) ("A void judgment is to be distinguished from an erroneous one, in that the latter is subject only to direct attack. A void judgment is one which, from its inception, was a complete nullity and without legal effect.").

Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 171- 72, 59 S.Ct. 134 (1938) ("Every court in rendering a judgment tacitly, if not expressly, determines its jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter.");

Geico v. Jackson, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16814, *1 (1995) ("[A] default judgment constitutes an implicit ruling on subject matter jurisdiction and an erroneous determination does not make the judgment void under Rule 60(b)(4)").

"Either a judgment is valid or it is void, and the court must act accordingly once the issue is resolved." In re Marriage of Hampshire, 261 Kan. 854, 862, 934 P.2d 58 (1997).

"A judgment is void if the court acted in a manner inconsistent with due process. A void judgment is a nullity and may be vacated at any time." 261 Kan. at 862.

"A void judgment is one that has been procured by extrinsic or collateral fraud or entered by a court that did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties." Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95, 353 S.E.2d 756, 758 (1987)

A judgment obtained without jurisdiction over the defendant is void. Overby v. Overby , 457 S.W.2d 851 (Tenn. 1970).

A void judgment is one of the grounds for relief under Rule 60, Tenn. R. Civ. Proc. See Rule 60.02(3).

When the law prescribes a place of imprisonment to which a convicted defendant can be sentenced, the court cannot direct a different place of incarceration, and, if it does, the sentence is void and the defendant is entitled to resentencing. State v. Bouck, 2001 ND 153, 633 N.W.2d 163

There is no time limit for attacking a void judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(iv). Eggl v. Fleetguard, Inc., 1998 ND 166, 583 N.W.2d 812

Habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy to attack a void judgment or sentence. See Ex parte Seidel, 39 S.W.3d 221, 224, 225 at n. 4 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001); Ex parte Beck, 922 S.W.2d 181 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996); Heath v. State, 817 S.W.2d at 336 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991) (opinion on original submission); Ex parte McIver, 586 S.W.2d 851 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979).

A void conviction may be challenged in a post-conviction habeas corpus proceeding. Beck, 922 S.W.2d 181; Heath, 817 S.W.2d at 336; Ex parte McIver, 586 S.W.2d 851; Burns, 441 S.W.2d 532; Jenkins, 433 S.W.2d 701; Higginbotham, 382 S.W.2d 927; Strother, 395 S.W.2d 629; Rawlins, 255 S.W.2d 877.

If such an action by the trial court in Seidel rendered the dismissal void, then an even stronger case can be made that the violation of Article 1.13(c) in the instant case rendered the resulting conviction void. By Article 1.13(c), the Legislature has specifically prohibited a trial court from accepting a defendant's waiver of a jury trial until the court has appointed an attorney to represent him. Here, not only was "[t]he trial judge's action ... not authorized by law ...," Seidel, 39 S.W.2d at 225, the action was specifically prohibited by statute. Requiring an objection at trial in these circumstances would lead to a Catch-22 situation: a defendant must object to not having an attorney appointed to advise him as to waiver of jury trial, without having been advised by an attorney that he was entitled to such representation and advice. Given the absurdity of such a situation, we chose in the past to characterize the resulting conviction as "void" and allow the defendant to raise the issue in a habeas corpus proceeding. Otherwise, defendants, such as appellant, are left without a remedy even though there has been a clear violation of a mandatory statute.

Thus, in a long line of cases, most notably Heath and Seidel, we have held that some defects, even though they are "just" statutory defects, are so egregious that they are cognizable on habeas corpus. See Heath, 817 S.W.2d at 336; Seidel, 39 S.W.3d 221 at 225; Ex parte McIver, 586 S.W.2d 851 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979). In Heath, we characterized these defects as rendering the conviction "void." 817 S.W.2d at 336. However, we could have properly characterized as "fundamental" errors those "unauthorized sentences" and "statutory defects" which render a sentence void. No matter what we choose to call these "errors," the underlying purpose is the same: to balance a convicted person's interest in the vindication of his legal rights and the State's interest in the finality of convictions.

In Texas, a defendant has a statutory right to have counsel appointed before he can waive his right to a jury trial. The Legislature has decided that the right to a jury trial is so important that before a defendant can waive that right, he should have the opportunity to consult with counsel. If a trial court denies a defendant that right by refusing to appoint counsel, equity demands that the balance be struck in favor of the defendant. Therefore, a defendant should be allowed to contest, in a habeas corpus proceeding, a violation of Article 1.13(c).

The court then concluded that, in the case before it, the trial court had jurisdiction of the subject matter because it was a circuit court which has jurisdiction of all felonies and that any objection King had to jurisdiction over his person was waived by his personal appearance. (State v. King, 426 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1982)]

Conviction of a nonexistent crime results in a void judgment not subject to waiver. People v. McCarty 94 Ill. 2d 28, 37 (1983).

A recent discussion of the Rule 60(b)(4) grounds for attack on a void judgment may be found in Fisher v. Amaraneni, 565 So. 2d 84 (Ala. 1990). The judgment was set aside for lack of personal jurisdiction based on improper service by publication. The court defined a judgment as void "only if the court rendering it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or of the parties, or if it acted in a manner inconsistent with due process." Id. at 86 (citingWonder v. Southbound Records, Inc., 364 So. 2d 1173 (Ala. 1978)). It should be noted here that a Rule 60(b)(4) motion involves a different standard of review than the other Rule 60(b) subsections since the court held "[w]hen the grant or denial turns on the validity of the judgment, discretion has no place for operation. If the judgment is void it must be set aside ...."Fisher, 565 So. 2d at 87.

"The consequences of an act beyond the court's jurisdiction in the fundamental sense differ from the consequences of an act in excess of jurisdiction. An act beyond a court's jurisdiction in the fundamental sense is void; it may be set aside at any time and no valid rights can accrue thereunder. In contrast, an act in excess of jurisdiction is valid until set aside, and parties may be precluded from setting it aside by such things as waiver, estoppel, or the passage of time." People v. Ruiz (1990) 217 Cal. App. 3d 574, 265 Cal. Rptr. 886

Held: Petitioner was not accorded a fair and impartial trial, to which he was entitled under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; his conviction is void; the judgment denying habeas corpus is vacated; and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings affording the State a reasonable time to retry petitioner. 366 U.S. 717

See American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 166-67 (1932) (applying res judicata to action seeking to set aside judgment for lack of jurisdiction);"Browning v. Navarro, 887 F.2d 553, 558-59 (5th Cir. 1989) (res judicata applies to actions to void judgment for fraud).

Although Rule 60(b)(4) is ostensibly subject to the "reasonable" time limit of Rule 60(b), at least one court has held that no time limit applies to a motion under the Rule 60(b)(4) because a void judgment can never acquire validity through laches. See Crosby v. Bradstreet Co., 312 F.2d 483 (2nd Cir.) cert. denied, 373 U.S. 911, 83 S.Ct. 1300, 10 L.Ed.2d 412 (1963) where the court vacated a judgment as void 30 years after entry. See also Marquette Corp. v. Priester, 234 F.Supp. 799 (E.D.S.C.1964) where the court expressly held that clause Rule 60(b)(4) carries no real time limit.

In a long and venerable line of cases, the Supreme Court has held that, without proper jurisdiction, a court cannot proceed at all, but can only note the jurisdictional defect and dismiss the suit. See, e.g., Capron v. Van Noorden, 2 Cranch 126; Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43. Bell v. Hood, supra; National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. of Railroad Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 465, n. 13; Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524, 531; Secretary of Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S. 676 , 678 (per curiam); United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348 ; Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 721; and Chandler v. Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 86—88, distinguished. For a court to pronounce upon a law’s meaning or constitutionality when it has no jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition, an ultra vires act. Pp. 8—17.

Recent Decisions

…And there is no indication in the statute that! such relief cannot be granted because the judgment also involve a judicial error which may have caused the surprise.

In the instant case did not the court have statutory jurisdiction over its judgment although it may have committed a judicial error in its rendition? That is dependent upon whether or not a judgment given in excess of a stipu­lation, and when the party interested is not present, is one taken against him through his “mistake, inadvertence, surprise or inexcusable neglect" Under a statute precisely like our own in the Oregon court held, that, "a judgment rendered against a party contrary to an understanding or argument with his ad­versary is taken against him by 'surprise' within the meaning of this section" (Durham v. Commercial Nat, Bank (1904) 45 Ore, 385, 387, 77 Pac, 902; Bellinger and Cotton Comp.. Stats., § 103 (Ore,).) A Kentucky case reached the same result. (Sebree v. Sebree (1907) 30 Ky Law Rep. 709, 9 S. W. 282.) On the other hand, the court in the case under consideration arrived at a contrary result. However, the cases cited in support of this decision, with one exception, do not come within the statutory jurisdiction conferred by the code, because the applications for relief had not been made within six, months after judgment, The only exception was in a case where the facts precluded any possibility of surprise, as all parties were present when the order in question, granting relief in excess of a stipulation, was rendered. (Dyerville Mfg. Co. v, Helles (1894) 102 Cal. 615, 36 Pac 928; Egan v. Egan (1891) 90 Cal 15, 27 Pac, 22; the exception is Mann v. Mann (1907) 6 Cal. App, 610, 92 Pac. 740.) In all the other cases the court had to rely upon its general jurisdiction over judgments, but has already shown, it has no authority to correct judicial errors therein, and as the error in these cases came within that category the court naturally could give the applicant no relief, There­fore, if the appellate court was basing its negative answer, to the question above propounded, upon these cases it would seem that its conclusion was unjustifiable.

The question then may be asked, what difference does it make whether this relief be granted or not; the party has his remedy by motion for a new trial or an appeal, If the judgment were vacated, in all probability, another trial would be necessary to get a proper judgment. But suppose a mistake like this, in the judgment, is not discovered until after sixty days from the entry thereof. The time for moving for a new trial, or appealing would have expired. Then the only remedy would be under section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as there the injured party is given six months in which to ask for relief. So, although the practical result of this case, at first glance may not seem to be harsh, still there are situations where this decision would deprive a litigant of a right to which, apparently, he is entitled, and which other jurisdictions would give him.

Pleading: Motion to Vacate Judgment by default: Mistake by Attorney — "The policy of the law is it have every litigated cause tried on its merits". Barri v. Rigero (1914) 168 Cal, 736, 740, 145 Pac. 95. An indi­cation of how far the courts are willing to go in order to bring a case to trial before them on its merits is given by the decision of Toon v, Pickwick Stages (April 7, 1924) 43 Cal. App. Dec 808 Pac. 628, reversing an order deny...

egregious, adjective: Conspicuously and outrageously bad or reprehensible.

cog·ni·za·ble Knowable or perceivable. Law. Able to be tried before a particular court.

This is Ashton the Picture on the left was before she was kidnapped by Officer Nagy Wichita Police Dept. EMCU

The Picture on the right was taken during one of our "Supervised" 1 hour visits after the Wichita Children's Home and Youthville drugged her up without my knowledge.

WHATS WRONG WITH THAT PICTURE
ALL FOR A FALSE REPORT OF TRUANCY.